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INTERMEDIATE FORMS OF ABSTRACTION/
BY TH. RIBOT.
HAVING thus acquainted ourselves in the two previous Open
Courts with the factor of speech, which as an instrument of
abstraction becomes steadily more and more important, we can
take up the subject of abstraction from the point at which we left
it. In passing from the absence to the presence of the word, from
the lower to the intermediate forms of abstraction, we must again
insist on our principal aim: viz., to prove that abstraction and
generalisation are functions of the completely evolved mind. They
exist in embryo in perception, and in the image, and at their ex-
treme limit involve suppression of all concrete representation.
This conclusion will hardly be contradicted. The difficulty is to
follow the evolution step by step, stage after stage, and to note the
difference by objective marks.
For intermediate abstraction, this operation is very simple. It
implies the use of words ; it has passed the level of prelinguistic
abstraction and generalisation. We may go farther, and—always
with the aid of words—establish two classes within the total cate-
gory of mean abstraction :
1. The lower forms, bordering on generic images, whose ob-
jective mark is the feeble participation of the word : it can indeed
be altogether foregone, and is only in the least degree an instru-
ment of substitution.
2. The higher forms, approximating to the class of pure con-
cepts, and having as their objective mark the fact that words are
indispensable, since these have now become an instrument of sub-
stitution, though still accompanied by some sensory representa-
tion.
1 Translated by Frances A. Welby.
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The legitimacy of this division can be justified only by a de-
tailed comparison of the two classes.
Before giving examples that determine the nature and intel-
lectual trend of the lower forms, a theoretical question presents
itself which cannot be eluded, albeit any profound discussion of it
belongs to the theory of cognition rather than to psychology. It is
as follows : Is the difference between generic images and the low-
est concepts, one of nature or of degree ? This question has some-
times been propounded in a less general and more concrete form.
Is there any radical difference, any impassable gulf between animal
intelligence^ in its higher, and human intelligence in its lower as-
pects? Some authors give an absolute negation, others admit com-
munity of nature, and of transitional forms.
I shall first reject as inadmissible the argument that identifies
abstraction with the use of words. Taine seems at times to admit
this: "We think," he says, "the abstract characters of things by
means of the abstract names that are our abstract ideas, and the
formation of our ideas is no more than the formation of names
which are substitutes. "^ Clearly if abstraction is impossible with-
out words, this operation could only begin with speech. All that
was said in previous articles proves the inanity of such an asser-
tion.
Let us, in order to discuss the question profitably, sum up the
principal characteristics of generic images on the one hand, of in-
ferior concepts on the other.
Generic images are : (i) simple and of the practical order; (2)
the result of often-repeated experiences; (3) extracts from very sa-
lient resemblances; (4) a condensation into a visual, auditory, tac-
tile, or olfactory representation. They are the fruit of passive as-
similation.
The inferior concepts most akin to them, which we are study-
ing in the present instance, are in character : .(i) less simple; (2)
less frequently repeated in experience; (3) they assume as mate-
rial, similarities mingled with sufficiently numerous differences;
(4) they are fixed by a word. They are the fruit of active assimi-
lation.
It may be said that the two classes, when thus opposed to each
1 Intelligence is taken here in its restricted sense, as the synonym of abstracting, generalis-
ing, judging, reasoning.
'iDe I' intelligence, Vol. I., Bk. IV., Chap, i, p. 254, first edition.
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other, present but minimal differences, save for the addition of
words. For the moment, indeed, the word is only an instrument
handled by a bad workman, who ignores its efficacy and highest
significance, as will be proved below. But were it otherwise, and
were the delimitation between the two classes in no way fluctu-
ating, the thesis of a progressive evolution must needs be given
up, unless it be admitted to begin only with the appearance of
speech.^
Romanes describes the passage from the generic image to the
concept as follows :
"Waterfowl adopt a somewhat different mode of alighting
upon land, or even upon ice, from that which they adopt when
alighting upon water; and those kinds which dive from a height
(such as terns and gannets) never do so upon land or ice. These
facts prove that these animals have onerecept answering to a solid
substance, and another answering to a fluid. Similarly, a man will
not dive from a height over hard ground, or over ice, nor will he
jump into water in the same way as he jumps upon land. In other
words, like the water-fowl, he has two distinct recepts, one of
which answers to solid ground, the other to an unresisting fluid.
But unlike the water-fowl, he is able to bestow upon each of these
recepts a name, and thus to raise them both to the level of con-
cepts. So far as the practical purposes of locomotion are con-
cerned, it is, of course, immaterial whether or not he thus raises
his recepts into concepts; but, as we have seen, for many other
purposes it is of the highest importance that he is able to do this.
Now, in order to do it, he must be able to set his recept before his
own mind as an object of his own thought : before he can bestow
upon these generic ideas the names of "solid "and "fluid," he
must have cognised them as ideas. Prior to this act of cognition,
these ideas differed in no respect from the recepts of a water fowl
;
neither for the requirements of his locomotion is it needful that
they should : therefore, in so far as these requirements are con-
cerned, the man makes no call upon his higher faculties of idea-
tion. But, in virtue of this act of cognition whereby he assigns a
name to an idea known as such, he has created for himself—and
for purposes other than locomotion—a priceless possession ; he has
formed a concept."^
In point of fact, the transition is not so simple. Romanes
omits the intermediate stages : for with fluid and liquid we pene-
i De I' intelligence, I., Bk. IV., Chap, i, p. 254, first edition.
^ Mental Evolution in Man, pp. 74 and 75.
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trate into a more elevated order of concepts than those immedi-
ately bordering on the generic image. What he well brings out is
that the bare introduction of words does not explain everything. It
must not be forgotten that if the higher development of the intelli-
gence depends upon the higher development of speech, this last is
conditioned, not simply by the faculty of articulation, which exists
among many animals^ but by anterior cerebral conditions that have
to be sought out.
For these, we must return to the distinction loosely established
above, between passive and active assimilation. We know that
the fundamental mechanism of cognition may be reduced to two
antagonistic processes, association and dissociation, assimilation
and dissimilation ; to combine, to separate ; in brief, analysis and
synthesis.^ In the formation of the generic image, as we have
seen, assimilation plays the principal part ; the mind works only
upon similarities. In proportion as we recede from this point, we
have the contrary; the mind works more and more upon differ-
ences; the primitive and essential operation is a dissociation; the
fusion of similarities only appears later. The further back we go,
the more analysis preponderates, because we are pursuing resem-
blances more and more hidden by differences. Coarser minds do
not rise above palpable similarities. The peasant who hears a dia-
lect or patois closely akin to his own understands nothing of it; it
is another language to him ; whereas even a mediocre linguist im-
mediately perceives the identity of words that differ only in accent.
We may represent the differences between generic images and
these general notions that most nearly approximate to them, by the
following symbol :
I. ABCde II. Abcde
ABCef xyzAf
ABCgh, etc. gAhkm, etc.
where each line corresponds to an object, and each letter to one of
the principal characters of the object. Table I is that of the
generic image. A part, ABC, is constantly repeated in each ex-
perience ; moreover, it is in relief, as indicated by the capitals ; the
elimination of differences is almost passive,—self-caused; they are
forgotten.
Table II is that of a fairly simple general notion. Here A has
to be disengaged from all the objects in which it is included. It
lAs Paulhan remarks, " L'abstraction et les idees abstraites " [Revue Pkilosophique, ]&n.,
1889, p. 26 et seq.), these two processes are initially linked one with the other, so that we find an-
alytical syntheses, and synthetical analyses.
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still has a salient character, indicated by capitals, and recurring in
each object ; but as it is merged in the differences, as it represents
but a poor fraction of the total event, it is not disengaged spon-
taneously; it exacts a preliminary labor of dissociation and elim-
ination.
Thus understood, the difference between the two processes
consists only in the faculty of greater or less dissociation, and we
are in no way authorised in assuming a difference of nature.
But the question may be propounded in a different manner,
—
more precise and more embarrassing, I formulate it thus: the
generic image is never, the concept is always a judgment. We
know that for logicians (formerly at any rate) the concept is the
simple and primitive element ; next comes the judgment, uniting
two or several concepts ; then ratiocination, combining two or sev-
eral judgments. For the psychologist, on the contrary, affirmation
is the fundamental act ; the concept is the result of judgments (ex.
plicit or implicit), of similarities with exclusion of differences. If
in addition to this we recall what was said above : that speech
commences with phrases only, that in its simplest form it is the
word-phrase ; then the debated question may be thus transformed :
Is there, between the generic image and judgment in the lower
forms, a break in continuity, or a passage by slow transformation ?
For the partisans of the first theory, the appearance of judg-
ment is a "passage of the Rubicon" (Max Miiller). It is as im-
possible to deny this as to affirm it positively and indisputably.
Romanes, who makes a stand against the "passage of the Rubi-
con," admits the following stages in the development of signs, taken
as indicative of the development of intelligence itself.
1. The indicative sign; gesture or pronominal root; a dog
barking for a door to be opened, etc.
2. The denotative sign which is affixed to particular objects,
qualities, or actions ; for example, the parrot which on seeing a
person utters the name of the person, or some word which it has
associated with him, and which for the animal has become the dis-
tinctive mark of the person.
3. The connotative or attributive sign, which, rightly or
wrongly, is attributed to an entire class of objects having a com-
mon quality; for instance, the child which applies the word star to
everything that shines.
4. The denominative sign; or the intentional employment of
the sign as such, with a full appreciation of its value ; for example,
the word star in its meaning to the astronomer.
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5. The predicative sign, or a proposition formed by the appo-
sition of two denominative signs.^
This hierarchical order, while in some measure open to crit-
icism, indicates at least schematically the progressive passage from
the concrete to the higher abstractions, and may therefore be ac-
cepted.
It is clear that the two first stages scarcely pass beyond the
concrete.
To the third, Romanes attaches capital importance : judgment
begins with it. It may, however, be asked if affirmation really ex-
ists at this stage. For my own part I am inclined to admit it as
included in the generic image in its highest degree (for here too
there are degrees), under the form not of a proposition, but of an ac-
tion. The hunting dog assuredly possesses generic images of man
and of different kinds of game, under the visual and more espe-
cially the olfactory form. When it starts off on the scent of its
master, of a hare, or of a partridge, this is surely a judgment of a
certain kind, an affirmation, the least doubtful of all, seeing that it
is an act. The absence of verbal expression and of logical infor-
mation in no way alters the fundamental nature of the mental state.
We have already spoken in a previous Open Court of practical
judgments and ratiocinations; it is needless to reiterate.
The transition from the third to the fourth stage is even more
important. It is here that the true concept appears ; this point at-
tained, an almost unlimited progress is possible. Now the true
cause of the true concept is reflexion. This formula apj)ears to us
the simplest, the briefest, the most clear, and the most exact.
There is the possibility of concepts where there is the possibility in
the mind of detaching a single character (or several), extracted
from among many others, of setting it up as an independent entity,
of raising it into a known object, i. e., determined in its relations
with ourselves, and with other things. Example : to form the gen-
eral idea of a vertebrate. But this fundamental act—reflexion—is
not without antecedents, it does not spring forth as a new appari-
tion. It is the highest degree of attention, i. e., of a mental atti-
tude that we encounter very low down in the animal scale.
Discontinuity of evolution, in the passage from lower to higher,
is thus far from being established. Doubtless this, like all other
questions of genesis, leaves much to hypothesis, and can only be
decided on probabilities : yet these do not appear to favor a rup-
ture in continuity, and opposition of nature.
\Op. cit., VIII., 158-165.
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In sum—to confine ourselves to what is least contestable :
given the cerebral and psychological conditions for speech (not for
articulate language alone), and application of words to qualities
and attributes raised little by little into independent entities,—and
the decisive step has been taken. Such is intellectual progress,
and we may remark in passing that the process which creates the
true concept, leads fatally by the same issue to faith in idols, in the
entities realised.
Without for the moment pausing at this last point, let us under
a more positive form, and strictly on the lines of experimental psy-
chology, examine the nature of the lower forms of intermediate ab-
straction, determining it by examples. At the same time we shall
fix the intellectual level that corresponds to the moment of transi-
tion between generic images (animal form), and the higher ab-
stracts which have still to be studied in detail. The best method
is to take as a type such human races as have remained in the sav-
age or half-civilised state: these are more instructive than child-
hood, because they represent fixed and permanent conditions. We
can draw on two principal sources : their languages, and their sys-
tems of enumeration. Their religious beliefs might also be studied
with the same results, but this would take too long, and would
moreover be less definite.^
I. The languages, considered under their most general charac-
teristics, reveal a notable impotence for transcending the simplest
resemblances, an incurable incapacity for extended generalisa-
tions ; they hardly rise above the concrete. Words play a very in-
distinct part ; they are the most incomplete substitute—hardly
more than a mark, a sign, like gestures—differing from the latter
only in the future they carry within them. The study of the as-
cending progress of generalisations is in effect the study of the suc-
cessive phases of the emancipation of speech up to the time when
it becomes preponderant and dominating. At the actual stage,
which might be termed concrete abstract, it is not yet emancipated ;
it is a minor, under tutelage.
Let us take in turn substantives, adjectives, and verbs.
The indigenes of Hawaii, says Max Miiller {^Lectures on the Sci-
ence of Language, Second Series, II., p. 19), have but one word,
1 We have touched on this subject incidentally in La psychologic lies sentiments (Part II., IX
,
§ 2, pp. 305 et seq ). Many tribes do not get beyond polydemonism, peopling the universe with
innumerable genii ; this is the reign of the concrete. A certain progress is marked by subordi-
nating the genius of each tree to the god of the forest, the different genii of a river to the god of
the river, etc. At a degree higher, the intellect constitutes a single god for water, one for fire,
one for the earth, etc. Thus there come to be genii of individual, specific, and generic origin.
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"aloba," to express love, friendship, esteem, gratitude, benevo-
lence, etc.; on the other hand, words to express variations in the
direction of the force of the wind are very numerous, proving once
more how at its origin abstraction or dissociation is governed by
practical causes. In savage languages there are terms to express
not merely each species of dog, but their age, the color of their
hair, good or bad qualities, etc. So, too, for the horse ; there are
special words to designate its varieties, and all its movements ; to
indicate if it is mounted, not mounted, frightened, running away,
and the like. The North American Indians have special words for
the black oak, the white oak, and the red oak, but none for the oak
in general,—still less for tree in general. The indigenes of Brazil
can point out the different parts of the body, but not the body as a
whole (Lubbock). Among several tribes of Oceania, a special
word is employed for the tail of a dog, another for the sheep's tail,
and so on, but they have no designation for tail in general. Again,
there is no common term for the cow, but there are distinct words
for red, white, or brown cows (Sayce).
There are, however, cases of very clear progress in generalisa-
tion ; the significance of a word extends itself; from specific it be-
comes generic. This metamorphosis exists in vivo among the
Finns and Laplanders. The former have a name for the smallest
stream, and none for river; originally again there was a term for
each finger, none for finger in general ; but latterly the term used
for thumb alone has come to designate the fingers collectively.
Among the second race, certain tribes who had a special denomi-
nation for each kind of bay, have now adopted one that serves for
all kinds (Max MuUer).
The same holds good of the poverty of the adjective, the ab-
stract term proper. The case of the Tasmanians has often been
quoted, how they could only express qualities by concrete repre-
sentations : hard= like a stone; long= legs; round= like a ball,
like the moon, etc. (Lubbock). A less familiar case, termed by
linguists " concretism," is met with even in certain more developed
idioms, like a survival of the time when the mind was unable to
detach itself from the concrete, or to forego a complete and de-
tailed qualification. Instead of saying ten merchants, five hens,
the idiom is merchants ten men, hens five birds, and so on for sim-
ilar cases.
The verb is able to express all degrees of abstraction and of
generalisation as well as the adjective and substantive. At this pe-
riod, it exactly repeats the type (as described above) of the sub-
INTERMEDIATE FORMS OF ABSTRACTION. 357
stantive with its burdensome multiplicity,—for want of a generali-
sation simple enough, according to our judgment. The North
American Indians have special words for saying : to wash one's .
face, another person's face, the linen, utensils, etc.: in all, thirty
words, but none for washing in general. So, too, for eating bread,
fruits, meat, etc., striking with the hand, foot, axe, etc., for cut-
ting wood, meat, or any other objects : for all these there are spe-
cial terms, but none for saying simply, to eat, to knock, to cut
(Sayce, Hovelacque). On the other hand, here is a case of transi-
tion, analogous to that of the Lapps and Finlanders. Certain
tribes in Brazil have a few verbs of general, simple significance :
eat, drink, dance, see, etc., even love, thank, etc. (Lubbock).
We need not multiply examples ; these will suffice to throw
into relief the extreme impotence in generalising, so soon as the
mind loses its hold on the concrete. We might also recall the dif-
ficulty so often experienced by missionaries. They find it almost
impossible, even by creating new words, or by changing the mean-
ing of others, to translate the sacred books into these idioms, from
their paucity of concrete terms.
2. T/ie niiine7-atio)i, taking its development as a whole, appears
to sub-divide into three principal periods : concrete numeration, as
studied above, in animals and children ; concrete-abstract numer-
ation, with which we are now occupied ; purely abstract numera-
tion, which we shall examine later, as translated into organised
arithmetic.
We have seen that speech at its origin was so humble as to
need gesture to complete and to elucidate it. During its concrete-
abstract period, numeration is in an analogous position. At first
its extension is very limited : it progresses slowly and painfully
from unity. Further, it can operate only when sustained by the
concrete ; it must have a material accompaniment. Counting is
accomplished by the enunciation of words, with the aid of enumer-
ated objects, as perceived at the same time, or with that of the fin-
gers : which, let it be remarked, is the first essay in substitution.
There is simultaneously concrete or digital, and verbal numera-
tion.^
We know that many Australian and South American tribes can
count verbally to two only; some say two-one = three ; two-two =
four; others by the same process arrive at six (two-three = five,
three-three = six) : everything else is "much." For the most part
ITylor, Primitive Culture. I., gives abundant data on this question. Chap. VII. is entirely
devoted to it.
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they count without words, with the aid of fingers or of articulation
;
even when they employ words, the two numerations—digital and
verbal—are performed simultaneously.^
This manner of counting is in first degree concrete ; the con-
crete-abstract form is only there in embryo. A great advance,
made early enough in many tribes, consisted in counting by five,
taking the hand (five fingers) as a new unit, superior to the simple
unit. Then: one hand = 5 ; two hands or half a man = 10 ; two
hands, one foot = 15; two hands, two feet, or a man ^ 20. Such
is the evident origin of the quinary, decimal, and vigesimal numer-
ations. Sometimes fingers, as instruments of numeration, have
been replaced by objects of a typical number. Ex. : i = moon or
sun ; 2 = the eyes or legs, etc.
However varied these processes (of which only a few have
been mentioned) in different races and periods, they are fundamen-
tally identical to the psychologist. They may be reduced to this
;
numeration is performed more particularly with the aids of sensible
perceptions ; words are but an insignificant accompaniment, a su-
perfluity—existing only as a proliferation -of so little utility that
they are for the most part neglected.
Though it is less often spoken of, we may remark that the
measure of continuous quantity passed through the same concrete-
abstract phase ; and here it appeared at a somewhat early stage,
owing to practical and social wants. Hence we find at the outset
the foot, the finger, the thumb (inch=Fr. pouce), the palestra
(four fingers' length), span, cubit (arm's reach = r<?«^/^), fathom,
etc., the stadium (distance a good runner could cover without
stopping).^ The concrete character of all these measures is obvi-
1 In the account of his travels among the Datnaras {Tropical South Africa, p. 133) Galton
says : " In practice, whatever they may possess in their language, they certainly use no numeral
greater than three. When they wish to express four, they take to their fingers, which are to them
as formidable instruments of calculation as a sliding-rule is to our English schoolboy. They puz-
zle very much after five, because no spare hand remains to grasp and secure the fingers that are
required for ' units,'
—
yet they seldom lose oxen : the way in which they discover the loss of one,
is not by the number of the herd being diminished, but by the absence of a face they know."
[This tallies with what we have already said as to so-called numeration in animals and chil-
dren.] " When bartering is going on, each sheep must be paid for separately. Thus suppose
two sticks of tobacco to be the rate of exchange for one sheep, it would sorely puzzle* a Damara
to take two sheep and give him four sticks. I have done so and seen a man first put two of the
sticks apart and take a sight over them at one of the sheep he was about to sell. Having satisfied
himself that one was honestly paid for, and finding to his surprise that exactly two sticks re-
mained in hand to settle the account for the other sheep, he would be afflicted with doubts ; the
transaction seemed to come out too pat to be correct, and he would refer back to the first couple
of sticks, and then his mind got hazy and confused, and wandered from one sheep to the other,
and he broke off the transaction until two sticks were put into his hand and one sheep driven
away, and then the other two sticks given him and the second sheep driven away." Galton re-
lates many other similar facts which he had himself witnessed.
2 And the barley-corn of English measure.— TV.
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ous. Again, there are survivals in certain current locutions, such
as a day's journey. More than this ; they have a human charac-
ter, their standard and starting-point being, at least at the outset,
certain parts of the body, or a determined sum of muscular move-
ments. Little by little they lost their original significance, pro-
gressing through centuries towards our metrical system—the type
of a scientific, deliberate, rationally abstract system, as far as pos-
sible liberated from anthropomorphism.
The reader will probably obtain a more definite idea of the na-
ture of these lower forms by recapitulating the examples cited, than
from any long dissertation. Is their intellectual level very superior
to that of the generic image ? This question is doubtful. At times
the only distinction between them is the presence of the word : at
the present stage it makes but a poor figure,
—
yet with all its mod-
esty, it augurs a new world wherein it is to be of prime impor-
tance.
